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GYPSIES, TRAMPS & THIEVES1:
WHAT EUROPE’S ROMANIES CAN TEACH THE
UNITED STATES ABOUT CRIME-MOTIVATED
IMMIGRATION REFORM
Allie Karoline Sievers *
This comment proposes that the United States could learn a great deal about the
dangers of extreme immigration policy-making by looking to the European states
and their dealings with the Romani, specifically the French expulsions of the
Romani in 2010. Through this lens, this comment analyzes flaws in the U.S.’
crime-motivated immigration enforcement programs, and argues that the U.S.
needs to move quickly to remedy flaws in immigration enforcement before it repeats
many of the mistakes that led to the current condition of Europe’s Romanies and
creates its own class of un-integrated ethnic minorities.
INTRODUCTION: THE CRIMES THAT SPARK THE DEBATE
On July 16, 2010, police in the small town of Saint-Aignan, France shot and
killed Luigi Duquenet.2 According to media reports, Mr. Duquenet failed to stop his
car at a checkpoint, continued to drive with an officer on the hood of his car, and
was killed after driving his car at officers policing a second checkpoint – one of
whom opened fire. 3 Mr. Duquenet was twenty-two years old and a member of
France’s “Gens du voyage” population,4 made up of Romani5 and other travelling
CHER, GYPSIES, TRAMPS & THIEVES (Kapp Records 1971).
Allie Karoline Sievers, J.D. candidate, Penn State University Dickinson School of Law,
2012. I would like to thank Ann & Bob Sievers and Matthew Dempsey for their unending love,
support, and encouragement. I would also like to thank the entire JLIA staff for their editing
assistance throughout the writing process.
2 See Bruce Crumley, Anger as Sarkozy Targets Roma in Crime Crackdown, TIME, July 23, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2005818,00.html.
3 See Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, Rioting over Traveller Killed by Police Sparks Debate on Security, IRISH
TIMES, July 21, 2010, at 10.
4 See Crumley, supra note 2; see also Council of Europe, Roma and Travellers Glossary 5 (Dec. 11,
2006), www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/Source/documents/GlossaryRoma.doc [hereinafter Roma
and Travellers Glossary] (defining “Gens du voyage” as a French administrative term applicable to Roma
and non-Roma groups with nomadic lifestyles).
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peoples. In the days following Mr. Duquenet’s death, approximately fifty youths
from his encampment rioted in and around Saint-Aignan, attacking the local police
station with hatchets and iron bars, burning cars, and causing damage to local
businesses and public property.6 These events are believed to have played a major
role in prompting French President Nicolas Sarkozy to make several controversial
policy decisions regarding the Romanies,7 including efforts to expel illegal Romani
from France8 and break-up Romani encampments.9
Meanwhile, in the U.S., a number of high-profile crimes have been linked to
similar fear-driven proposals for immigration reform. Most notably, on March 27,
2010, rancher Robert Krentz was found shot to death on his Arizona ranch shortly
after radioing to his brother that he was stopping to assist somebody he believed to
be an illegal immigrant.10 Officials and commentators have often cited his death as
the impetus for Arizona’s controversial immigration law, SB 1070.11
Robert Krentz’s murder, of course, is just one in an increasingly long line of
crimes in the U.S. that have been attributed to immigrant populations and used to
fuel the fire of the immigration debate. In September 2008, an illegal Guatemalan
immigrant who had been arrested in the U.S. at least twelve times drove his S.U.V.
through a busy intersection in Colorado and smashed into a pick-up truck.12 The
pick-up truck was propelled forward, and ultimately crashed into an ice cream parlor,
killing three people, including a three-year-old child.13 And more recently, in August
2010, an elderly nun was killed in Virginia when a drunken driver crashed into her

In this comment, the term “Romani” (plural “Romanies”) will be used in any discussion of
Gypsy, Roma, or appropriate Traveller populations. While the term “Gypsy” continues to be used in
common parlance, it is viewed as pejorative by many European Romani populations and will not be
used in this comment unless it appears in a quote or statistic. I have chosen to use Romani in lieu of
“Roma,” as this term is embraced by all Romani groups, has been adopted by the Library of Congress
as the official Subject Heading for materials on the Romani people, and has been given preference by
preeminent scholars of Romani culture, including Ian Hancock. See Roma and Travellers Glossary, supra
note 4, at 7; see also Interview by Rory Litwin with Barbara Tillett, Chief of the Library of Congress
Cataloging
Policy
and
Support
Office
(Aug.
9,
2006),
available
at
http://libraryjuicepress.com/blog/?p=115; IAN HANCOCK, WE ARE THE ROMANI PEOPLE xxvii – xx
(2002).
6 See Crumley, supra note 2.
7 See id.
8 In late July 2010, Mr. Sarkozy ordered the expulsion of Romanies who had committed
“public-order offenses.” As of September 2, 2010, it was estimated that France had removed 8,313
Romanies in 2010. See Matthew Saltmarsh, World Briefing Europe; France: Plan on Gypsy Camps Opposed,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, at A7; see also Stephen Castle, European Union Report Questions France’s
Expulsions of Roma, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010, at A11.
9 In addition to announcing plans to expel illegal Romani from France, Mr. Sarkozy also
announced plans to take down illegal Romani camps. France’s Interior Minister indicated that he
planned to take down about 300 illegal camps, 200 of which were Romani. See Saltmarsh, supra note 8.
10 See Randal C. Archibold, Ranchers Alarmed by Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, at A9.
11 See Dan Stein, Op-Ed., Arizona’s Simple, Legal Goal: The State Is Just Doing What the Federal
Government Isn’t -- Enforcing Our Laws, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at 19.
12 See Dan Frosch, In Colorado, Debate Over Program to Check Immigration History of the Arrested,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, at A16.
13 See id.
5
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car.14 The driver was an immigrant who was work-authorized at the time of the
accident but had been residing in the U.S. illegally since 1996 and was in deportation
proceedings for two prior D.U.I. convictions.15
While France and the U.S. have frequently diverged over international affairs,
perhaps most notably during the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001,16 there
are unavoidable similarities between the ways in which each government has
responded to perceived increases in crime attributed to immigrant populations at
home. For instance, there are indications that the French population is supportive of
Mr. Sarkozy’s recent moves against the Romani population,17 and recent polls in the
U.S. suggest that Americans are in favor of legislation such as Arizona’s SB 1070. 18
It is undeniable that immigration has sparked an intense debate in each country.
This comment proposes that the U.S. could stand to learn a great deal about
its immigration problems by looking at the mistakes that have been made with the
Romani population in Europe for centuries, highlighted by the actions taken in
France in 2010. Specifically, the U.S. should look at accusations that France has
violated core principles of the European Union (EU) by moving against the Romani
and should strive to avoid promoting immigration policy that threatens to create a
permanent sub-class of U.S. citizens and residents.
After providing a sample of the high-profile violence that has ignited the
immigration debate in France and the U.S. in the Introduction, 19 Part I continues
with a brief history of the Romani in Europe intended to give flesh to Mr. Sarkozy’s
recent efforts to expel Romani populations from France.20 Part I will also provide a
brief overview of the EU’s Free Movement Directive and its application to recent
events in France.21
Part II provides a short overview of several leading U.S. immigration law
cases, as well as the recent shift in the focus of immigration enforcement towards
crime and national security. 22 Part II also provides a snapshot of current
immigration enforcement operations, focusing on three major programs: the 287(g)
program, the Criminal Alien Program, and Secure Communities.23

14 See Robert McCartney, A World of Both Grace, Disgrace is Revealed in Nun’s Death, WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 2010.
15 See Police Chief Says Illegal Immigrant Accused in Driving Death had Work Permit, WASH. POST,
Sept. 4 2010.
16 See Elaine Sciolino, Aftereffects: Paris; France Works to Limit Damage from U.S. Anger, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at A13.
17 See Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, Sarkozy Requests Law Revoking Citizenship, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 7,
2010, at 10.
18 See Denis Bunis, Polls Show U.S. Torn Over Arizona Law, THE ORANGE COUNTY REG., July
11, 2010; see also Randy Krehbiel, Strict Immigration Bills Still Enjoy Solid Support, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 31,
2011, at A1.
19 See supra Introduction.
20 See infra Part I.A.
21 See infra Part I.B.
22 See infra Part II.A.
23 See infra Part II.B.
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Part III focuses on the criticisms that have been articulated against both
French and U.S. immigration policy, and strives to highlight how the U.S. could
improve its own immigration outlook by looking to the mistakes made in Europe
with the Romani populations.24 Specifically, Part III suggests that the U.S. needs to
move quickly to remedy apparent flaws in immigration enforcement before it repeats
many of the mistakes that led to the current condition of Europe’s Romanies and
creates its own class of un-integrated minorities. 25 Part III concludes by
recommending that the departments and agencies responsible for immigration move
to streamline current enforcement programs, clarify enforcement goals, and make
serious efforts to edify the U.S. public regarding immigration crime rates and other
statistics.26
I. PERSECUTION & FREE MOVEMENT IN EUROPE
A. A Brief History of the Romani Population in Europe & the Development of Modern AntiRomani Sentiment
In order to fully understand why France’s recent “expulsions” of the Romani
population have generated so much negative commentary, it is necessary to
understand the history of Romani persecution in Europe and the Romani culture
that has developed as a result. The Romani people originally haled from the Indian
subcontinent, beginning their migration to Europe and North Africa late in the first
millennium C.E.,27 and their presence in Europe quickly became turbulent. In 1471,
the first anti-Romani law was recorded in Lucerne, Switzerland, and since 1504,
France has periodically enacted laws under which Romani were barred from residing
in French territory.28 In 1830, Germany began implementation of a policy by which
Romani children were removed from their homes and placed with non-Romani
families 29 in an effort to rid children of deviant Romani traits. 30 In 1934, the
condition of the Romani further disintegrated when Sweden began sterilizing their
Romani population, and the circumstance of the Romani reached its ultimate low
during World War II, when the Romani were singled out by Hitler for eradication
See infra Part III.A-C.
See infra Part III.C.
26 See infra Part III.D.
27 See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMP’T AND SOC. AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE
SITUATION OF ROMA IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 7 (2004), available at
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/the-situation-of-roma-in-an-enlarged-european-unionpbKE6204389/ [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT].
28
See The Patrin Web Journal, Timeline of Romani (Gypsy) History,
http://www.reocities.com/Paris/5121/timeline.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). In addition to the
1504 law prohibiting Roma residences in France, similar laws were passed by various French
monarchs and leaders in 1510, 1539, 1561, 1660, 1724, 1764 and 1803. Apart from the various
residence prohibitions, France has a long history of other anti-Roma laws. For example, in 1601,
Henry IV prohibited Roma gatherings of more than three or four persons. In 1647, 1666 and 1682,
Louis XIV instituted policies by which Roma were sent to the galleys as a result of their status as
“bohemians,” and beginning in 1719, Roma were deported to the French colonies for the same
reason.
29 See id.
30 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27.
24
25
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along with Europe’s Jewish population. 31 The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
estimates that 200,000 Romani were killed in German concentration camps. 32
Furthermore, it is believed that in some areas, including the modern Czech Republic,
the Romani population was almost entirely wiped out during this “Romani
Holocaust.”33 In the years following the war, efforts were made throughout Europe
to stifle the nomadic and anti-social lifestyle of the Romani. 34 Across Europe,
coercive sterilization policies and the systematic removal of children from Romani
families became common.35
Today, Europe’s Romani population faces widespread anti-Romani
sentiment. 36 Recent polls conducted in the Czech Republic and Germany are
indicative of this trend, finding that seventy-nine percent of Czechs would not want
a Romani neighbor, and sixty-four percent of Germans had an unfavorable opinion
of the Romani people as a whole.37
The Romani response to this unyielding persecution has largely been to
withdraw from mainstream European society.
While the various Romani
populations do not share a common language, religion, or defined cultural identity, 38
nearly all Romani groups share a common “gypsy law,”39 which has developed in an
effort to further insulate the Romani from the general population of each host
country.40
Certain aspects of the gypsy law have exacerbated the anti-Romani sentiment
prevalent in Europe today. For example, under the Romani legal tradition, theft and
fraud crimes are considered to be true crimes only when perpetrated against other
Romani. 41 Theft crimes committed against non-Romani are often praised, while
theft crimes committed against other Romani frequently lead to public shaming and
banishment.42 Furthermore, Romanies tend to insist that their law is superior to the
law of the host nation, making it easier for them to justify violations of the host
nation’s theft and fraud laws.43 European governments have often cited problems
with theft, begging, and other violence in support of actions taken against Romani
communities.44
See id.
See Saltmarsh, supra note 8.
33 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27, at 8.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 9.
37 See id. at 9-10.
38 See Iskra Uzunova, Roma Integration in Europe: Why Minority Rights are Failing, 27 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 283, 290 (2010).
39 See generally Symposium, Gypsy Law Symposium, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 225 (1997), for
additional information regarding the history and substance of gypsy law.
40 See Uzunova, supra note 38, at 294.
41 See id. at 295.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See Elisabetta Povoledo, Italian Cities Plan to Shut Roma Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010,
at A4; see also Suzanne Daley & Raphael Minder, In Spain, Gypsies Find Easier Path Toward Integration,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, at A5.
31
32
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The recent events in France are no exception. In the days and weeks
following Mr. Sarkozy’s announcement that his government would begin targeted
removals of the French Romani population, various officials attempted to justify the
move by stating that Romani camps in France were “sources of illegal trafficking,
profoundly shocking living standards, the exploitation of children for begging,
prostitution, and crime.”45 Mr. Sarkozy himself indicated that his decision to focus
on the Romani was part of an “implacable struggle the government is leading against
crime,” 46 and France’s Interior Minister pointed to crime statistics suggesting that
there had been a 138% increase in the number of Romani arrested in Paris in the
preceding year.47
In addition to the legal and criminal issues that seem to drive most of the
anti-Romani sentiment in Europe today, there are indications that other factors,
including financial considerations, also figure into modern negative perceptions of
the Romani.48 For example, a recent study conducted by the World Bank concluded
that the failure of the Romani to integrate in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and the
Czech Republic cost the host countries an estimated $7.3 billion per year. 49 As a
result, while institutions including the EU,50 the Catholic Church,51 and the European
Roma Rights Centre52 have spoken out against the actions taken by Mr. Sarkozy, the
French people have been notably absent from the international debate. This relative
quiet suggests that the French may not be as opposed to Mr. Sarkozy’s proposals as
the rest of the world might expect them to be. Indeed, a survey conducted by the
French newspaper Le Figaro shortly after Mr. Sarkozy announced his plans for the
Romani in late July found that nearly seventy-five percent of French voters
supported his tough stance against the Romani.53 A separate poll by the newspaper
Le Parisien found that forty-eight percent of the French supported the removals.54
B. An Introduction to the Free Movement Directive
While many of the criticisms of Mr. Sarkozy’s recent decision to break up
Romani encampments and expel illegal Romani from France have centered on issues
Gavin Hewitt, The Roma Repatriation, Gavin Hewitt’s Europe, BBC NEWS, Aug. 19, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/gavin_hewitt/.
46 Crumley, supra note 2.
47 See Doreen Carvajal, France Vows to Continue Deporting Roma, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/world/europe/26ihtroma.html?scp=2&sq=doreen+carvajal&st=nyt; see also EU to test Roma removals, THE AUSTRALIAN,
Aug. 27, 2010, at 9.
48 See Europe’s Roma: Hard Travelling, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2010, at 29.
49 See id.
50 See Katrin Bennhold & Stephen Castle, France May Face Legal Action Over Expulsions of
Roma, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, at A6.
51 See Steven Erlanger, France: Sarkozy and Pope Meet Over French Actions Against Roma, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A6; see also Carvajal, supra note 47; EU to test Roma Removals, supra note 47.
52 See European Roma Rights Ctr., Submission in Relation to the Analysis and Consideration of
Legality Under EU Law of the Situation of Roma in France: Factual Update (2010), available at
http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=3715 [hereinafter European Roma Rights Centre Submission].
53 See Mac Cormaic, supra note 17.
54 See EU to Test Roma Removals, supra note 47.
45
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of racism and past persecutions, the European Commission has questioned the
legality of France’s decisions on another basis – claiming that France’s policies
violate the EU’s Free Movement Directive (the Directive).55 The Directive, which
was drafted in 2004 and entered into force in April 2006,56 reflects the fundamental
EU principle that “[c]itizenship in the Union confers on every citizen of the Union a
primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the
Member States” subject to certain limitations set forth in the Directive and the
governing treaties of the EU,57 including the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.58
The Free Movement Directive is an expansive document, addressing
everything from family membership to registration and documentation requirements
in seven chapters and forty-two articles; several of these articles are directly on point
with respect to the French expulsion of the Romani.59 Initially, it is important to
note that the Directive affords to EU citizens the right of residence in another
Member State for a period of three months with no conditions or formalities aside
from possession of a valid identity card or passport.60 This right is afforded to all
Union citizens so long as they do not impose an “unreasonable burden” on the host
Member State’s social assistance systems.61 Union citizens who are self-employed,
who obtain employment in the host Member State, or who have sufficient resources
(including insurance) to support themselves and any accompanying family members
are not subject to the three-month limitation.62 The right to residence afforded to
Union citizens in another Member State covers the entire territory of the host state,
and may be restricted only if the same restrictions apply to nationals of the host
state.63
With respect to expulsion from the host state, the Directive is extremely
strict, mandating that no Union citizen or family member may be automatically
expelled due to reliance on social assistance programs. 64 The Directive does,
however, allow restrictions to be imposed on rights to free movement and residence
on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health.65 Nevertheless, any
action taken by a host state on these grounds must be proportional and must be

See Stephen Castle, Europe Advances Case Against France Over Expulsions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2010, at A14; see also Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Eur. Comm’n Assesses Recent Developments
in France, Discusses Overall Situation of the Roma and EU Law on Free Movement of EU Citizens
(Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter European Commission Press Release].
56 See Eur. Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, The Situation of Roma EU Citizens Moving to
and
Settling
in
Other
EU
Member
States,
at
11
(2009),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=813&langId=en&moreDocuments=yes.
57 Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 158).
58 See Eur. Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, supra note 56, at 18; see also Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0068000003.
59 See Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 158).
60 See id. at art. 6(1).
61 Id. at art. 14(1).
62 See id. at art. 7(1).
63 See id. at art. 22.
64 See Council Directive 2004/38/EC, art. 14(3), 2004 O.J. (L 158).
65 See id. at art. 27(1).
55
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based solely on the personal conduct of the individual who will be restricted.66 The
conduct of the individual to be restricted must represent a “genuine, present and
sufficiently serious threat” affecting a fundamental interest of the host state. 67
General preventative measures are not permitted.68 When considering expulsion, the
host Member State must also consider how long the individual has resided in the
host state, his or her age and health, economic status, as well as the degree to which
he or she has socially and culturally integrated into the host state.69
Once the host Member State has decided to initiate the expulsion of a Union
citizen, the individual concerned must be notified of this decision in writing, and in
most cases, the writing must specify the grounds on which the expulsion decision
was made.70 The notification must also advise the individual being expelled of the
court or administrative agency responsible for appeals, and the individual must be
given at least one month to depart the host state.71
Lastly, the Directive requires that all Member States transpose the elements
of the Directive into their own laws, regulations, and administrative processes.72
II. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAW – CUSTOM & ENFORCEMENT
A. Plenary Power & the Origins of Crime-Based Deportation Programs in a Post 9-11 United
States
In 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court decided one of the first major U.S.
immigration law cases, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, also known as the Chinese
Exclusion Case.73 In this seminal case, the Court recognized that Congress and the
Executive Branch have inherent authority to regulate immigration issues pertaining
to the exclusion of noncitizens seeking admission to the U.S.74 As the basis for this
holding, the Court declared that the power to exclude noncitizens was an “incident
of sovereignty” 75 and that the power of the legislature to exclude aliens was a
proposition not “open to controversy.” 76 In 1893, the Court extended the
application of this inherent authority to the expulsion, or deportation, of noncitizens
in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.77 Specifically, the Court stated that “[t]he right of a
nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any
See id. at art. 27(2).
Id.
68 See id.
69 See Council Directive 2004/38/EC, art. 28(1), 2004 O.J. (L 158).
70 See id. at art. 30(1, 2).
71 See id. at art. 30(3).
72 See id. at art. 40(1).
73 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
74 See JON FERRE, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, PLENARY POWER: SHOULD JUDGES
CONTROL
U.S.
IMMIGRATION
POLICY?
3
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2009/back209.pdf (discussing the roots of the plenary power doctrine in
U.S. immigration law).
75 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
76 Id. at 603.
77 See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
66
67
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steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into
the country.”78
Taken together, these cases support the premise that a sovereign state
generally has wide latitude to establish the criteria by which outsiders can be
admitted to and expelled from its territory. Over the decades, the U.S. has
established many such criteria, barring individuals from admission if they suffered
from HIV/AIDS, 79 practiced polygamy, advocated the forcible overthrow of the
government, failed a literacy test, or engaged in prostitution.80
In recent decades, there has been increased emphasis on the application of
criminal and national security criteria to immigration enforcement. One of the
earliest examples of this application occurred in 1979, following the Iranian Hostage
Crisis. 81 On November 13, 1979, President Carter directed the promulgation of
Regulation 214.5, requiring all Iranian post-secondary students in the U.S. to report
to a local INS office so that their nonimmigrant status could be verified. 82 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld this regulation in Narenji v. Civiletti,
with Circuit Judge MacKinnon stating that the regulation at issue lay within the realm
of foreign affairs and therefore “implicat[ed] matters over which the President has
direct constitutional authority.”83 The court also cited to the Supreme Court holding
in Matthews v. Diaz, stating that “any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the
flexibility of the political branches of the government to respond to changing world
conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution.”84
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been an even
more marked shift toward the enforcement of immigration laws on criminal and
national security grounds. On October 26, 2001, in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks, President Bush signed into law the USA Patriot Act,85 which was designed,
in part, to increase the authority of U.S. law enforcement agencies to investigate
terrorism and to facilitate the sharing of information between the various law
enforcement agencies.86 Shortly thereafter, in September 2002, the Department of
Justice initiated the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS),87
Id. at 707.
See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 462 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009).
80 See id. at 422-425.
81 See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
82 See id.
83 Id. at 748.
84 Id. (citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
85 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
86
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).
87 On April 28, 2011, DHS announced that the NSEERS program would be suspended,
effective immediately. See Removing Designated Countries From the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System (NSEERS), 76 FED. REG. 82, 23,830 (Apr. 28, 2011); see also Miriam Jordan,
Controversial Surveillance Program Launched After 9/11 Ends, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2011,
78
79
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requiring nonimmigrant aliens from countries presenting “elevated national security
concerns” to be fingerprinted and photographed upon entry to the U.S. as well as to
provide detailed background information to officers of the INS. 88 These targeted
registration requirements were upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Kandamar v. Gonzales because they served the “legitimate government
objectives of monitoring nationals from certain countries to prevent terrorism.”89
These cases and policies are illustrative of the broad brush that has been
utilized by Congress and the Executive when formulating immigration policies.
Understanding these trends is essential to appreciating the basis of the criminal
immigration programs that have come into effect in recent decades, primarily under
the umbrella of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agreements of
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ACCESS), including
the 287(g), Criminal Alien, and Secure Communities programs.90
B. Immigration Enforcement under ICE ACCESS
1.

Immigration Cross-Designation 287(g)

Roughly fifteen years ago, Congress enacted amendments to the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) via the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).91 Included in these amendments was a new
section, 287(g),92 permitting the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (formerly
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)) to enter into agreements
with state and local law enforcement agencies whereby those agencies can perform
immigration officer functions after training and under the supervision of ICE. 93
Initially developed by Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa, the 287(g) program was
meant to address frustration among his constituents that local law enforcement was
powerless against immigration problems, having to report violators to overburdened

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704187604576289682985267902.html?mod=googl
enews_wsj.
88 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Second Phase of National Security Entry-Exit
Registration
System
Announced
(Nov.
22,
2002),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/November/02_ag_649.htm.
89 Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2006).
90
The ICE ACCESS initiative currently consists of fourteen programs: Asset
Forfeiture/Equitable Sharing, Border Enhancement Security Task Force (BEST), Criminal Alien
Program (CAP), Customs Cross-Designation (Title 19), Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces,
Fugitive Operations, Immigration Cross-Designation – 287(g), Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
Center, Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC), Operation Community Shield, Operation Firewall,
Operation Predator, Rapid REPAT, and Secure Communities. See U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, ICE ACCESS, http://www.ice.gov/access/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2012) [hereinafter
ICE ACESS Overview].
91 See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration
Authority
Section
287(g)
Immigration
and
Nationality
Act,
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) [hereinafter 287(g)
Fact Sheet].
92 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
93 See 287(g) Fact Sheet, supra note 91. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).

106

2012

Comment

1:1

ICE officials instead of taking direct action. 94 The program operates through
memoranda of agreement (MOA) entered into by DHS, ICE, and the local law
enforcement agency (LEA), the first of which was entered into by the Bush
Administration in 2002.95 A majority of the agreements currently in existence are
detention model programs, which permit correctional officers to screen any
individuals arrested or convicted against federal databases to check their immigration
status.96
In response to widespread criticism of the 287(g) program, including a report
published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in January 2009,97
the Obama Administration immediately re-assessed the program upon taking
office.98 In July 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced sweeping changes
to the program,99 including the introduction of a new Model MOA,100 which aligned
the priorities of the 287(g) program with those of ICE generally.101 As such, the new
Model MOA prioritizes the removal of aliens who have been arrested or convicted in
connection with “major drug offenses” or violent crimes such as murder, rape, or
manslaughter.102 Aliens convicted of minor drug offenses, property crimes, or other
offenses are to be given lesser priority.103
From a statistical standpoint, the 287(g) program has proven to be an
effective tool for ICE as the department focuses on the removal of criminal aliens
from the U.S.; from January 2006 to December 2009, immigration charges were
See Mimi E. Tsankov & Christina J. Martin, Measured Enforcement: A Policy Shift in the ICE
287(g) Program, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 403, 413-14 (2010).
95 See JESSICA VAUGHN & JAMES R. EDWARDS, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE
287(G) PROGRAM:
PROTECTING HOME TOWNS AND HOMELAND 4 (2009), available at
http://www.cis.org/287greport [hereinafter CIS 287(G) BACKGROUNDER].
96 See Tsankov, supra note 94, at 417.
97 The Government Accountability Office criticized the execution of the 287(g) program on
several fronts: (1) federal objectives to prioritize the most dangerous criminals were not clearly
communicated to participating LEAs; (2) it was unclear from federal materials how participating
LEAs could use their authority under the program; (3) the nature and extent of ICE’s supervision of
the program was imprecise; and (4) data requirements imposed on the LEAs were unspecific. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
BETTER
CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
98 See Tsankov, supra note 94, at 422.
99 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Announces
New Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New
Agreements (July 10, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1247246453625.shtm.
100 See Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Model MOA (Memorandum of Agreement), available at
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/287g-MOA-2009-07-14.doc
[hereinafter
Model
MOA].
101 See Tsankov, supra note 94, at 422-23; see also Memorandum from John Morton, Civil
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June
30,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionreform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf (articulating three clear immigration enforcement
priority groups: aliens posing a danger to national security or public safety, recent illegal entrants, and
aliens who are fugitives or who obstruct immigration control).
102 See Model MOA, supra note 100, at 17.
103 See id.
94
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lodged against 81,000 criminal or undocumented aliens by 287(g) officers. 104
Furthermore, the program has been touted as a “force multiplier,” allowing ICE to
supplement its regional forces to accomplish more arrests and removals.105
2.

Criminal Alien Program

Another noteworthy program falling under the umbrella of ICE ACCESS is
the Criminal Alien Program (CAP),106 which seeks to prevent criminal aliens from
being released into the general population by securing a final order of removal prior
to their release from federal, state, or local prison.107 Like the other programs falling
within ICE ACCESS, CAP is meant to be utilized to target and remove the most
serious criminal aliens.108 Generally speaking, the program has proven to be very
efficient, with ICE reporting that in fiscal year 2008, 221,085 charging documents
were issued to initiate the removal of criminal aliens in the U.S. prison system. 109
This represents a forty-six percent increase over the 2007 fiscal year, during which
164,296 charging documents were issued under CAP.110 The program is currently
active in all 114 U.S. federal prisons, and as of March 2008,111 the program was active
in approximately ten percent of the nation’s local jails.112
Like the 287(g) program, CAP relies on cooperation with local law
enforcement to accomplish its goals. Specifically, local officers are asked to notify
the ICE Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) whenever they
identify foreign-born detainees during their facility’s booking process. 113 DRO
officers then interview inmates flagged by local officers to determine whether they
wish to initiate an immigration hold against the individual. 114 Traditionally,

See CIS 287(G) BACKGROUNDER, supra note 95, at 1.
See id. at 2. In 2008, the ICE investigations office based in Denver made 1,594 arrests in
Colorado and several other states covered by that team. In the same period, the 287(g) force in
Colorado made 777 in-state arrests.
106 CAP as it exists today was created in 2007 through the merger of two older programs:
the Institutional Removal Program and the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program. See MELISSA
KEANEY & JOAN FRIEDLAND, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF THE KEY ICE
ACCESS PROGRAMS, 287(G), THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM, AND SECURE COMMUNITIES 4 (2009),
available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/ice-access-2009-11-05.pdf [hereinafter
NILC ICE ACCESS OVERVIEW].
107
See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Criminal Alien Program,
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
108 See TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST.
ON RACE, ETHNICITY, AND DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE
CRIMINAL
ALIEN
PROGRAM
1
(2009),
available
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter WARREN INST.
REPORT].
109
See
2008
ICE
ANN.
REP.
at
3,
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_08.pdf
[hereinafter
2008 ICE ANNUAL REPORT].
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 See NILC ICE ACCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 106, at 4.
113 See id.
114 See id.
104
105
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interviews were conducted in person.115 However, since 2006 the interviews have
increasingly been conducted telephonically.116 The switch to remote interviewing has
been accompanied by the creation of a real-time computer system providing LEAs
with 24-7 access to ICE.117 If an immigration hold is in place, the local facility is
required to notify ICE prior to releasing the individual from custody and may hold
the individual for an additional period, not to exceed forty-eight hours, so that they
may be transferred to ICE custody.118
3.

Secure Communities

A third major program falling under the umbrella of ICE ACCESS is the
Secure Communities program, which was introduced by DHS in 2008. 119 Secure
Communities, intended to expand CAP, is specifically targeted towards state and
local prison systems 120 and, like the other ICE ACCESS programs, relies upon
cooperation and coordination with LEAs.121 The program functions by transmitting
digital fingerprints, taken from aliens upon arrest or imprisonment, to ICE where
they are matched against federal immigration databases. 122 Upon creation of the
program, Congress requested that it accomplish four goals: (1) identify and process
all criminal aliens subject to removal in state and local prison systems; (2) enhance
ICE detention strategies to ensure that no removable criminal alien is released into
the public due to lack of detention space; (3) reduce the time a removable criminal
alien remains in detention prior to removal; and (4) maximize cost effectiveness. 123
Like the 287(g) program and CAP, the Secure Communities program is intended to
target the most dangerous criminal aliens for removal, 124 with a focus on aliens
convicted of major drug offenses and violent crimes such as rape and murder.125
Secure Communities is similar to its predecessors in that it has been,
numerically speaking, successful in accomplishing federal deportation goals. In a
letter to the New York Times in December 2009, John Morton, then Assistant
Secretary for ICE, reported that Secure Communities identified 11,000 aliens
convicted of serious crimes such as rape and murder in its first year alone, 1,900 of
whom had been removed. 126 In March 2010, the Los Angeles Times reported that
Secure Communities had identified 18,000 aliens convicted of serious crimes and
See id.
See id.
117 See NILC ICE ACCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 106, at 4; see also WARREN INST. REPORT,
supra note 108, at 1.
118 See NILC ICE ACCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 106, at 4.
119 See 2008 ICE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109, at iii.
120 See id. at 5.
121 See ICE ACESS Overview, supra note 90.
122 See Thomas Frank, New Effort Helps Finger, Net Potential Deportees: Program Uses Inmates’
Prints to Discover Illegal Status, USA TODAY, May 12, 2009, at 3A.
123 See 2008 ICE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109, at 5.
124 See Hearing on Priorities Enforcing Immigration Law Before the H. Appropriations Subcomm. on
Homeland Security, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of David Venturella, Executive Director, Secure
Communities, Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
125 See 2008 ICE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109, at 5.
126 See John Morton, Letter to the Editor, Immigration Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009.
115
116
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that 4,000 had been removed.127
III. HOW IT ALL COMES TOGETHER
A. French Criticism
On September 29, 2010, the European Commission issued a warning to the
French government in response to its efforts to expel members of the Romani
community from France in the late summer and fall of 2010.128 In the accompanying
press release, the Commission acknowledged that it had been assured by France that
measures taken to remove Romani persons from France were not undertaken with
the intent to discriminate against the Romani ethnic minority; however, the
Commission also stated that France had not fully transposed the 2004 Free
Movement Directive as required. 129 The Commission gave France just over two
weeks to respond to its warning with a detailed plan for full transposition of the
Directive.130
In 2010, France’s flawed transposition of the Free Movement Directive
existed, primarily, in two sources of law: Law No. 2006-911 of July 24, 2006 and
Ministerial Decree No. 2007-371 of March 21, 2007. 131 Collectively, these
instruments addressed immigration, integration, and Union citizens’ rights of
residence. 132 Additional guidance with respect to transposition was also found in
various circulaires, which addressed a variety of issues ranging from health care to
admission and expulsion criteria.133 In June 2011, France added to its transposition
of the Free Movement Directive by enacting Law No. 2011-672.134 Following the
enactment of this new legislation, questions remained regarding the accuracy and
completeness of France’s transposition of the Directive;135 however, these issues are
See Paloma Esquivel, O.C. Jail Inmates’ Status Checked: The County Joins 11 Others in the State
in Seeking to Deport Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at 4.
128 See European Commission Press Release, supra note 55; see also Castle, supra note 55.
129 See European Commission Press Release, supra note 55; see also Council Directive
2004/38/EC, art. 40(1), 2004 O.J. (L 158) (requiring all Member States to implement laws, regulations,
and administrative policies to incorporate the principles of Directive into their domestic law within
two years).
130 See European Commission Press Release, supra note 55.
131 See MILIEU ENVTL. LAW & POLICY, CONFORMITY STUDY FOR FRANCE: DIRECTIVE
2004/38/EC ON THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS OF THE UNION AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS TO MOVE
AND RESIDE FREELY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE MEMBER STATES 6 (2008) (Belg.), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/30160637/null [hereinafter CONFORMITY STUDY].
132 See id.
133 See id. at 6-7.
134 See Loi 2011-672 du 16 juin 2011 relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité
[Law 2011-672 of June 16, 2011 on Immigration, Integration and Nationality], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 17, 2011.
135 See Eur. Parliament, Parliamentary Question: Compliance of French Law No 2011-672 of 16 June
2011 on Immigration, Integration and Nationality with EU legislation (Sept. 22, 2011),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011008463+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; see also France’s Compliance with the European Free Movement Directive
and the Removal of Ethnic Roma EU Citizens: A Briefing Paper Submitted to the European Commission in July
2011, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/28/france-s127
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beyond the scope of this comment, which focuses on the law as it existed in 2010.
Leading up to France’s Romani expulsions in 2010, several independent
studies criticized the French transposition of the Directive. In 2008, the University
of Edinburgh and Milieu Ltd. conducted a conformity study that analyzed the
correctness and sufficiency of France’s efforts to transpose the Directive into their
domestic law.136 In pertinent part, the study concluded that France’s transposition of
Article 27 of the Directive, speaking to the restriction of free movement based on
the personal conduct of the individual concerned, was incomplete.137 Specifically, the
study suggested that France’s failure to prohibit the use of expulsion to facilitate
economic advantage, as well as its failure to specify that the conduct of the individual
to be expelled must constitute the only grounds for expulsion, rendered the
transposition inadequate. 138
Furthermore, the study found that France’s
transposition of Article 28(1) of the Directive, speaking to protections against
expulsion, was nonexistent, 139 and that the notice requirements and procedural
safeguards of the Directive had not been fully transposed.140
In February 2009, the European Parliament released its own evaluation of
the French transposition, concluding that it was ambiguous and, in some instances,
contrary to the spirit of the Directive itself.141 Like the Edinburgh study above, the
European Parliament study found that there were insufficient protections in place
with respect to expulsion, stating that protections against expulsion prompted by
reliance on social assistance were not guaranteed as required under the Directive.142
The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) released an additional study on
this topic in September 2010. 143 This study alleged violations of the nondiscrimination clauses of the Directive, suggesting that France had a pattern of
singling out the Romani ethnic minority for law enforcement actions.144 In addition,
the study indicated that expulsion documents utilized in 2010 were produced en
masse; making it unlikely that adequate consideration was afforded to individual
circumstances as required under Article 28 of the Directive. 145 Furthermore, the
ERRC study suggested that France, in 2010, facilitated the expulsion of Romani
persons who had resided in France for less than three months in violation of Article
compliance-european-free-movement-directive-and-removal-ethnic-roma-euciti#_Legal_Provisions_in.
136 See CONFORMITY STUDY, supra note 131.
137 See id. at 10-11.
138 See id. at 11.
139 See id. at 10-11.
140 See id. at 11.
141 See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE
UNION, APPLICATION OF DIRECTIVE 2004/38/EC OF 29 APRIL 2004 ON THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS OF
THE UNION AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS TO MOVE AND RESIDE FREELY WITHIN THE TERRITORY
OF
THE
MEMBER STATES iv (Feb. 2009) (Executive Summary), available at
www.statewatch.org/news/2009/feb/ep-free-movement-report.pdf.
142 See id.
143 See European Roma Rights Centre Submission, supra note 52.
144 See id. at 1.
145 See id. at 2.
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6 of the Directive.146
Collectively, the studies analyzing France’s failed compliance with the Free
Movement Directive, the actions taken against the Romani in 2010, and the rapid
response from the European Commission suggest that the position taken by the
French, with respect to the right of free movement within the European Community,
is at odds with the fundamental right of Europeans “to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States.”147 This most recent saga of Europe’s Romani,
combined with their tumultuous history, could provide law and policy makers in the
U.S. with an excellent, modern example of the risks associated with policy making in
the realm of migration.
B. U.S. Policy Criticism
As the sections above illustrate, crime-motivated immigration policy in the
U.S. today is largely comprised of the various programs administered under the
umbrella of ICE ACCESS. The ICE ACCESS programs operate under the common
auspice of assisting local LEAs as they deal with immigration enforcement issues in
their communities,148 and at first blush, the numbers suggest that the programs have
been successful. For example, in the 2010 fiscal year, DHS removed 387,000 foreign
nationals from the U.S., including 169,000 known criminal aliens. 149 However,
criticism of these programs has persisted, and there are legitimate questions as to
their overall functionality.
The criticisms plaguing the 287(g) program are illustrative of the criticisms
that have followed many of the ICE ACCESS programs in recent years. As
previously discussed,150 the 287(g) program was recently overhauled by the Obama
Administration following criticisms by the GAO. 151 Nevertheless, some of the
criticisms that beleaguered the program prior to the changes made under the Obama
Administration persist today. 152 In March 2010, DHS promulgated a report
See id. at 3.
Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 158).
148 See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet:
ICE Agreements of
Cooperation
in
Communities
to
Enhance
Safety
and
Security
(ACCESS),
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/access.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
149 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010,
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf.
150 See supra Part III.B.1.
151 See GAO REPORT, supra note 97.
152 On August 12, 2010, the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), a Hispanic civil rights
and advocacy group based in Washington D.C. released a report on the status of the 287(g) program
entitled “The Impact of Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on the Latino
Community.” In the report, the NCLR outlines various criticisms of the program, including: (1) its
application to noncitizens who commit minor crimes instead of the violent criminals who are the
program’s intended target; (2) its tendency to divert police attention away from traditional law
enforcement; (3) its propensity to undermine community-based strategies that rely on population
groups, such as immigrant populations, to report crimes to authorities; and (4) its vulnerability to
racial profiling and other civil rights violations. See A. ELENA LACAYO, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA,
THE IMPACT OF SECTION 287(G) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ON THE LATINO
COMMUNITY
(Aug.
12,
2010),
available
at
146
147
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recommending thirty-three changes to the 287(g) program, 153 a majority of which
pertained to the training and supervision of officers as well as the availability of
program information to the public.154 However, other recommendations set forth in
the report pertained to more serious civil rights and civil liberties concerns frequently
raised by advocacy groups.155
Specifically, the DHS report highlights concerns that the civil rights and civil
liberties track records of applicant LEAs are not formally evaluated during the
application process and that several participating LEAs have been embroiled in
claims of civil rights violations.156 Of particular concern is the fact that at the time of
the report, one LEA participant was involved in at least three lawsuits implicating
civil rights concerns; one pertaining to allegations of racial profiling in connection
with 287(g) participation, another pertaining to allegations of physical abuse inflicted
upon a detained noncitizen, and yet another pertaining to allegations of national
origin discrimination.157 The report also addresses concerns raised by various NGOs
that by permitting LEAs with suspect civil rights backgrounds to participate in the
287(g) program, ICE is increasing the likelihood that noncitizens will be subjected to
racial profiling.158
Criticism of the 287(g) program has also been reflected in the news media.
In December 2010, the New York Times published an in-depth expose of the risks
faced by illegal immigrants in the U.S. who drive without a valid license. 159 The
article centered on the case of Felipa Leonor Valencia, whose car was hit when a U.S.
citizen driver failed to stop at a red light in Lawrenceville, Georgia.160 The accident,
which triggered only a fine for the U.S. citizen driver, resulted in Ms. Valencia’s
being placed in immigration detention, as Gwinnett County, where Lawrenceville is
located, is a participant in the 287(g) program. 161 Ms. Valencia’s story is
representative of the fear, surrounding the 287(g) program, that minor offenders will
be caught up in enforcement as the program expands into more communities
nationwide. Meanwhile, in Lawrenceville, Hispanic leaders have suggested that
287(g) enforcement in their community has resulted in decreased attendance at
church services and decreased patronage at Latino restaurants because unlicensed
drivers are fearful of any interactions with local police. 162 Enforcement has also
http://www.nclr.org/index.php/site/pub_types/issue_briefs; see also Jeremy Redmon, Metro Agencies
to Feds: Let Us In, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Aug. 28, 2010, at A1.
153 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OIG-10-63, THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G)
AGREEMENTS 1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_1063_Mar10.pdf [hereinafter PERFORMANCE OF 287((G)].
154 See id. at 22.
155 See id.
156 See id. at 22-23.
157 See id. at 23.
158 See PERFORMANCE OF 287(G), supra note 153, at 23.
159 See Julia Preston & Robert Gebeloff, Unlicensed Drivers Who Risk More Than a Fine, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, at A1.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See id. Accord RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 48 (2011)
[hereinafter MIGRATION POLICY INST.].
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prompted some illegal aliens to relocate to other, friendlier parts of Georgia. 163
While the Gwinnett County Sheriff is pleased with these effects of the 287(g)
program, 164 it seems that enforcement policies that force immigrant populations
underground and discourage civic participation could have long term negative effects
on communities. The New York Times estimates that 4.5 million illegal immigrants
drive regularly, 165 most without licenses as only two states currently allow
undocumented immigrants to obtain a license.166 This is a huge group of people who
could be targeted by the 287(g) program if enforcement is not limited to the most
dangerous criminals it is meant to prioritize.
Persistent criticisms also plague the Criminal Alien Program. In September
2009, a policy brief published by the Warren Institute at Berkeley Law alleged that
ICE is not abiding by congressional directives to focus removal proceedings on the
most dangerous criminal aliens and that LEAs may be utilizing the program to
facilitate racial profiling. 167 The study, based on data collected in Irving, Texas,
suggests that the transition to telephonic interviews and 24-7 access to ICE led to a
spike in the number of Hispanic arrests in Irving as well as a spike in the number of
discretionary arrests based on low-level misdemeanor offenses, indicating that Irving
police may have been using CAP to facilitate increased deportations of Hispanic
immigrants. 168 Further, the study found that only two percent of immigration
detainers issued by ICE in Irving under CAP were based on felony charges.169
Additional criticism of CAP has come from the Obama Administration itself,
which issued a report on immigration detention in 2009.170 Data relied upon in the
report showed that of the 178,605 people detained by ICE through CAP in 2009,
fifty-seven percent had no criminal conviction.171 These numbers provide substance
to arguments frequently made by immigrant rights groups that enforcement of
criminal alien programs is too broad.
Finally, the Secure Communities program has also faced stiff criticism since
its development in 2008. As with the other programs falling under the umbrella of
ICE ACCESS, critics have expressed frustration with the program’s failure to
prioritize the most dangerous criminals. 172 Recently, the National Institute of
See Preston, supra note 159.
See id.
165 See id.
166 See Marc Lacey, License Access in New Mexico is Heated Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, at
A1 (indicating that, as of August 2011, only New Mexico and Washington issue driver’s licenses to
illegal immigrants that are the same as those issued to citizens); see also House Leader Proposes Immigrant
License Changes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 9, 2011 (discussing legislation recently introduced by New
Mexico House Speaker Ben Lujan to restrict immigrants’ access to state driver’s licenses).
167 See WARREN INST. REPORT, supra note 108, at 1.
168 See id. at 5.
169 See id. at 7.
170 See Nina Bernstein, Report Critical of Scope and Cost of Immigration Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
7, 2009, at A17.
171 See id.
172 In June 2011, John Morton issued a memorandum that greatly expanded the discretion
of ICE officials operating under the Secure Communities program. The memo, for example, permits
agents to consider factors such as length of residence, education, military service, and the seriousness
163
164
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Corrections issued a report analyzing Secure Communities statistics through March
22, 2009, finding that out of the 19,495 individuals identified through the program
thus far, only 1,436 were classified as dangerous criminals. 173 Furthermore,
immigrants’ rights groups have also expressed concerns that fears of racial profiling,
augmented by a jurisdiction’s enrollment in Secure Communities, may undermine
trust between immigrant communities and law enforcement, limiting the
effectiveness of traditional law enforcement.174 Specifically, many people fear that
implementation of the program will make immigrants less likely to report crimes or
testify.175
Just as the Obama Administration has acknowledged concerns with the
287(g) program and CAP, in recent months there has been a substantial effort made
to reign in Secure Communities. Specifically, on June 17, 2011, John Morton issued
an agency-wide memorandum clarifying the role of “prosecutorial discretion” in
immigration enforcement. 176 The memo, in part, discussed the scope of
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration system, enumerated factors that may be
taken into consideration when determining whether or not to exercise discretion, and
clarified which ICE employees may exercise discretion in accordance with their
specific responsibilities. 177 The memo also makes clear that discretion may be
exercised at any stage of the deportation process.178 This memo has been interpreted
by many in the immigration field as an effort to focus the program more closely on
immigrants convicted of serious crimes and limit the extent to which individuals with
minor convictions, or no conviction at all, are caught up in the system.179 And the
memo has already had a seemingly positive impact on the program. Building upon
the parameters established by Morton, the Obama Administration announced in
August 2011 that it would suspend deportation proceedings in cases where there was
no national security or public safety threat, and that it would review cases one by one
to determine whether or not to exercise prosecutorial discretion. 180 Further, the
portion of ICE’s website dedicated to the Secure Communities program now
includes a “What’s New” section outlining the agency’s various initiatives developed
in response to civil rights concerns, including: Advisory Committee & Minor Traffic
Offenses, Prosecutorial Discretion, Training for States, and Protecting Victims &
of a criminal act when deciding whether or not to pursue deportation in a given case. See Julia Preston,
U.S. Pledges to Raise Deportation Threshold, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2011, at A14.
173 See NILC ICE ACCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 106, at 6-7.
174 See Frosch, supra note 12.
175 See Kirk Semple, Program to Have Police Spot Illegal Immigrants is Mired in Confusion, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, at A26; see also Sam Dolnick & Kirk Semple, Report Questions the System Used to
Flag Rikers Island Inmates for Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, at A30.
176 See Memorandum from John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention,
and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [hereinafter June Morton Memo].
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178 See id.
179 See Julia Preston, U.S. Pledges to Raise Deportation Threshold, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2011, at
A14.
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Witnesses of Crimes.181
However, these are not the only changes that have been made to the Secure
Communities program. In recent months, several states have expressed a desire to
opt-out of Secure Communities due to concerns about its over-inclusive nature and
the chilling effect it may have on traditional law enforcement.182 However, in August
2011, the Obama Administration announced that the program would be mandatory
for all states and that it is to be effective nation-wide by 2013.183 This push to move
forward with the program, in spite of the concerns that have been raised by various
groups, is disconcerting even in light of the advancements signaled by the increased
application of prosecutorial discretion.
C. Challenges to Meaningful Immigration Reform in the United States & How Europe’s History
with the Romani Can Guide the Path Forward
As the increasing prevalence of criminal immigration enforcement programs
suggests, the national discourse on immigration is increasingly focused on violence,
be it on the southern border or in our nation’s jails and prisons. As the sections
above suggest, the programs developed in recent years by DHS (and ICE) to identify
and remove criminal aliens are flawed but necessary to protect our communities
from some of the most dangerous threats to our daily life. However, while the
threats are real, we must remember that there are other aspects of the immigration
system in the U.S. that are desperately in need of reform and avoid falling into the
trap of turning a blind eye to the larger problems. The saga of the European Romani,
specifically recent events in France, can teach us a great deal about the pitfalls of
trying to legislate migration and the risks associated with using preconceived notions
of immigrant populations for political gain.
Ever since the first recorded anti-Romani law was enacted in 1471, the
Romani have faced a steady stream of discrimination throughout Europe, a trend
that continues today.184 In August of 2010, high-ranking officials within the Sarkozy
administration justified their removals of hundreds of Romani from France by
pointing to crime statistics,185 while seemingly violating key portions of the EU’s Free
Movement Directive at every turn. Many outside observers surmised that Mr.
Sarkozy’s primary motivation for initiating the removals was political gain; he was
seeking to bolster an approval rating that had been devastated by a series of political
scandals in 2010. 186 But while Mr. Sarkozy’s motivations may never be fully
See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
182 See Brian Bennett, States Can’t Opt Out of Secure Communities Program, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6,
2011,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-secure-communities20110806,0,5832833,print.story.
183 See Kirk Semple & Julia Preston, Deal to Share Fingerprints is Dropped, Not Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at A11.
184 See Steven Erlanger & Scott Sayare, France Intensifies Effort to Expel Roma, Raising Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at A4. See also Povoledo, supra note 44.
185 See Stephen Castle, France: Government Defends Deportation of Roma, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2010, at A6.
186 See Crumley, supra note 2.
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disclosed, one thing is clear: France’s expulsion of the Romani in 2010 is simply the
latest in a long line of abuses directed towards an un-integrated ethnic minority in
Europe.187
Likewise, immigration reform has become a hot issue in American
elections,188 and several regional lawmakers have been catapulted onto the national
stage as a result of their divisive proposals. In April 2010, Arizona’s Governor, Jan
Brewer, became a central figure in the U.S. immigration debate after she signed SB
1070 into law, a controversial law that proposed, in part, to make failure to carry
immigration documents a crime and sought to give local law enforcement broad
powers to detain anybody suspected of being in the U.S. illegally.189 Although several
portions of the law were struck down in a July 2010 decision by the U.S. District
Court for the District of Arizona,190 many other states are following Arizona’s lead.191
Governor Brewer and her like-minded peers have frequently relied on criminal
justifications when speaking in support of Arizona-style legislation,192 arguing that
federal inaction with respect to immigration reform has forced state governments to
take control of the matter.193 But what immigration pundits in regional governments
and many news outlets often fail to report is that crime rates along the southern
border have actually declined, with instances of violent crimes in Arizona falling to
447 per 100,000 residents in 2008 from 532 per 100,000 residents in 2000.194 Further,
President Obama recently sent an additional 1,200 National Guard troops to the
southern border in an effort to further bolster security,195 and there is evidence that

See generally Violence in Bulgaria: Out in the Streets: Anti-Roma Rioting Spreads Across the
EU’s Poorest Country, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2011, at 25, for an example of continuing conflict. See also
Steve Erlanger, France: Time Limits on Begging, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011 at A5.
188 See Jeff Zeleny & Trip Gabriel, Gingrich’s Words on Immigration Become a Target, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2011, at A24.
189 See Randal C. Archibold, Helene Cooper, & Carl Hulse, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on
Immigration, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1.
190 See U.S. v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (2010), cert. granted 132 S.Ct. 845 (2011).
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Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, at A16; Kim Severson & Robbie Brown, Parts of Georgia
Immigration Law Blocked, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A17.
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ARIZONA REPUBLIC, June 26, 2010, at B1.
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state’s plans to pass Arizona style immigration legislation, stating that “[t]he federal government’s
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Political Battle on Immigration Shifts to States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, at A1.
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illegal border crossings have slowed dramatically.196
Another obstacle to achieving meaningful immigration reform in the U.S.
that closely mirrors problems with the Romani in Europe is the public perception of
immigrant criminality. Stories regarding criminal immigration issues regularly appear
in the news media, 197 feeding popular stereotypes that immigrant populations are
plagued with higher levels of crime and imprisonment than the general population.
However, a 2007 study by the Immigration Policy Center found that these
stereotypes are largely unsupported by crime statistics. 198 The Immigration Policy
Center concluded that, for every ethnic group, incarceration rates for young men are
lower for immigrants than for their American-born counterparts, including Mexican,
Salvadoran, and Guatemalan immigrants who account for a majority of the
undocumented population in the U.S.199 Strikingly, for the period studied, foreignborn Mexican immigrants had an incarceration rate of just 0.7% compared with a
rate of 5.9% for males of Mexican descent born in the U.S.200 The public perception
of crime rates among immigrant populations must be brought into line with reality if
we hope to defuse the arguments of those who would strip immigrant populations of
constitutional rights in the name of public safety.
D. How Do We Avoid the Pitfalls?
It is becoming increasingly clear that the U.S. needs to recalibrate not only its
immigration policy, but also its public perception of immigrant populations, lest the
U.S. fall into the same pitfalls that the countries of Europe have fallen into when
dealing with the Romani. If the U.S. fails to address these issues in a timely fashion,
it runs the risk of alienating immigrant populations within its borders and creating a
lesser class of minorities not fully assimilated into mainstream society. Several
options are available to address these issues, ranging from federal legislation to
administrative reform.
In the current political climate, it seems highly unlikely that any federal
legislation addressing immigration concerns is likely to pass successfully through
Congress. The failure of the DREAM Act201 in December 2010202 highlighted for
See Editorial, The Next Immigration Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, at A27.
A quick and dirty search of Westlaw for the thirty-day period leading up to January 6,
2011 returned 403 newspaper articles from the United States including the search terms “crime &
immigration & ‘United States.’”
198 See RUBEN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE MYTH
OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES
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MEN
(2007),
available
at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/myth-immigrant-criminality-and-paradoxassimilation.
199 See id. at 1.
200 See id.
201 DREAM Act legislation was first introduced in Congress in 2001 and seeks to provide
conditional permanent residence, and a path to legal permanent residence and citizenship, to certain
undocumented immigrants who have grown up in the United States and consistently exhibited good
moral character. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., DREAM ACT: SUMMARY (2010), available at
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/dream/dream-bills-summary-2010-09-20.pdf.
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many just how difficult it will be to pass any immigration legislation in the near
future. As a result, the key to reforming criminal immigration programs likely lies
with the departments and agencies that administer them – DHS and its main
enforcement arm, ICE. These organizations must take steps to consolidate
programming and clarify enforcement goals so that it is clear to observers who will
be targeted for immigration enforcement and why.
The first step DHS and ICE should take is to reevaluate and condense some
of the programs operating under ICE ACCESS. From the analysis of the 287(g)
program, CAP, and Secure Communities above, it appears that there are many
redundancies in the various programs currently administered by ICE.
Administrators should strive to isolate the strongest aspects of each program and
consolidate them into one overarching program. CAP and Secure Communities,
which already share the same identification and interview processes, could be merged
with the deputization approach utilized in the 287(g) program so that trained officers
are physically present at more detention centers across the U.S. to conduct interviews.
The presence of more federally trained officials on-site should help allay fears of
local law enforcement using these programs as a cover for racially motivated
immigration sweeps.
Second, DHS and ICE should make every effort to build upon the
memoranda which have been disseminated by John Morton in 2011203 by developing
and applying clear enforcement priorities that apply to all ICE ACCESS programs.
These priorities should include clear indications that not all deportees will be
criminals, so that there is less confusion over enforcement goals and techniques. By
being more straightforward regarding how immigration laws will be enforced,
misconceptions and unrealistic expectations that give rise to criticism may be avoided,
making it easier for ICE to move forward. Clarifying enforcement goals will require
more explicit instruction from both the Executive and Legislative branches. If the
goal is to have higher deportation numbers, this needs to be explicitly stated,
especially as it will likely result in fewer criminal deportations, which are more time
consuming.204 If, on the other hand, the goal is to remove more criminal aliens, this
also needs to be explicitly stated, as this will likely result in fewer total removals and
allegations from political opponents that the federal government is being “soft” on
immigration. Either way, clarity is key, and all involved parties should be prepared to
be more transparent going forward.
Lastly, all parties with a stake in the reform, from ICE’s leadership to the
President, should be prepared to encourage public edification on the subject of
immigration reform. As long as the public perception of immigration continues to
be shaped by ever increasing fears of rising crime rates and immigrant criminality, it
See Lisa Mascaro & James Oliphant, 111th Congress: Immigration and Arms Control – Dream
Act Was Key to Bigger Plan, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at 27.
203 See June Morton Memo, supra note 176; see also Memorandum from John Morton, Civil
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar.
2, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf.
204 See Spencer S. Hsu & Andres Becker, ICE Officials Set Quotas to Deport More Illegal
Immigrants, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2010, at A04.
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will be impossible to achieve meaningful immigration reform that brings immigrant
populations in the U.S. out of the shadows and into mainstream society where they
can be active and contributing members of our communities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since their arrival in Europe centuries ago, the Romani people have endured
unyielding mistreatment, causing them to largely withdraw from mainstream society.
Their withdrawal from the community has only cemented the public perception that
they are undesirable neighbors, criminals, and an economic drain. This perception
was highlighted for the world, once again, when France’s Nicolas Sarkozy announced
in late July 2010 that illegal Romani would be expelled from France and that their
camps would be dismantled.205 The U.S. is drifting perilously close to following in
these footsteps as it continues to implement immigration programs in the name of
national security and public safety but allows them to be executed haphazardly.
Critics of these programs paint a picture of illegal immigrants living in the U.S. who
are scared to drive, attend church services, or report crimes to local law enforcement
because they worry that they will be caught up in the ever increasing web of
enforcement programs implemented by ICE.206
While programs that strive to remove the most dangerous criminal aliens
from society are undoubtedly necessary in today’s world, the departments and
agencies that administer them need to be very clear about their goals, consider policy
changes to calm fears of racial profiling and other civil rights violations, and strive to
educate the public about the realities of immigration in the U.S. today. Unless steps
are taken to allay public fears and misconceptions, the U.S. is at risk of enacting
policies that permanently push minority groups and new waves of immigrants into a
Romani-like lesser class that will be unable or unwilling to fully integrate into
mainstream society. As a nation built on immigration and fueled by diversity, 207 the
U.S. cannot afford to follow this path.
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